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Joshua Fairfield

Escape Into the Panopticon: Virtual Worlds and the
Surveillance Society
The Eye: that horrible growing sense of a hostile will that strove with
great power to pierce all shadows of cloud, and earth, and flesh, and to
see you: to pin you under its deadly gaze, naked, immovable.1
introduction
Suppose that you move to a new town. To buy your home, you must allow
the developer to install cameras in each room and record all interactions
between you and your husband. To use the telephone, you must permit the
telephone company to record and retain your conversations. To receive mail,
you must allow the mail carrier to copy and index the contents. To access
funds, you must permit the bank to record all purchases. Suppose, too, that
much of this information can become available to government actors with a
simple subpoena rather than the more stringent search warrant.2 It may sound
incredible, but this is the reality for millions of people who live, work, and play
in virtual worlds.
The essential irony of virtual worlds is that populations seeking to build
new lives away from the public eye are moving into an environment that is
subject to constant surveillance. Virtual worlds currently operate like Jeremy
Bentham’s Panopticon prison.3 The Panopticon permitted a single guard in the
center of the prison to monitor all of the prisoners. The same degree of
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J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS 616 (Houghton Mifflin 1994) (1954).
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (permitting access to bank records with
a subpoena and noting the “general rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party to
obtain the records of that party does not violate the rights of a defendant”).
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., 1995).
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surveillance exists in virtual worlds. The denizens of virtual worlds are
constantly under surveillance by “game gods,” the private companies that
design, maintain, and administer virtual worlds.4 The game gods then must
comply with government requests for call details, wiretaps, stored chatlogs,
and other business records.5 The result: game gods’ cameras are on all the time
and the footage reaches law enforcement and the intelligence community.
I argue in this brief essay that as government enters virtual worlds it should
respect basic privacy rights. For intelligence and law enforcement purposes,
this most importantly includes the question of when government actors can
and should access a U.S. person’s private communications. Further, I argue
that private collection of personal information in virtual worlds is as much of a
threat to privacy as government surveillance.
reasonable expectations of privacy in virtual worlds
The basic legal regime for privacy prevents the intelligence community and
law enforcement from accessing a U.S. person’s private communications
without a warrant supported by probable cause.6 The constitutional standard is
one of a reasonable expectation of privacy,7 but courts have had some trouble
hammering out what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy online.8
The main point of contention is whether reasonable expectations of privacy are
determined by what the government can collect or by what it ought to collect.
The government can collect anything. So if the government refuses to respect
privacy, then any expectation of privacy is unreasonable.9 The alternative is for
courts to make a normative determination: when citizens reasonably act as
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One very common example of this monitoring is the retention of chat logs, which the
companies routinely record for customer assistance purposes.
For wiretaps and access to call details for voice over internet protocol, see Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000). For access to recorded
chatlogs via a subpoena, see Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(2), 2703(b)
(2000); and Second Life: Terms of Service, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php at ¶ 6.1
(last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that an expectation of privacy must be both
subjectively held and objectively reasonable).
See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying a motion
to suppress evidence based in part on a holding that there is no Fourth Amendment privacy
interest in subscriber information). But see State v. Reid, 914 A.2d 310 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2007) (holding that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in ISP account
information under the New Jersey state constitution).
See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56
ALA. L. REV. 9, 39 (2004) (“[T]he reasonable expectation of privacy test is circular.”).
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though their communications are private, courts must select rules that honor
those expectations, even if government possesses the technology to access the
information.10 Under this normative approach, the fact that government can
wiretap telephones or see through bedroom walls with thermographic cameras
does not reduce the expectations of privacy of U.S. persons in bed or on the
phone.11
In some ways, determining rational expectations of privacy in virtual
worlds is easier than determining expectations of privacy over telephone lines,
because computer technology allows virtual re-creation of real space. Virtual
worlds recreate streets and bedrooms.12 In the real world, most street-corner
conversations are public, and most bedroom conversations are private. Virtual
world technology is intentionally designed to make humans act as though the
virtual world is, at least in some respects, real. Thus, as a normative matter,
when corporations choose to use technology intended to entice humans into
acting as though they were safe in their own homes, or privately
communicating with friends, the law ought to respect those expectations as it
does in real life. I therefore argue that U.S. persons in virtual worlds possess a
reasonable expectation of privacy, such that a search of their virtual homes and
property should be subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
protecting u.s. persons’ personal information in virtual
worlds
Government surveillance is only half of the problem. The other half is the
untrammeled private collection of data. Companies collect information about
consumers to maximize profit or to gain business advantage.13 Unfortunately,
companies often lose control of the enormous amounts of information they
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See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351-52 ("[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.").
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the warrantless use of
thermal imaging to explore otherwise unobservable details of a private home is a violation of
the Fourth Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 359 (finding a reasonable
expectation of privacy in conversations over telephone lines).
See generally EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF
ONLINE GAMES 6-9 (2005) (describing the nature of worlds created through video game
technology).
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
623 (2d ed. 2006) (“An entire industry has arisen devoted to the creation of gigantic
databases of personal information . . . .”).

the yale law journal pocket part

118:131

2009

have gathered, which threatens U.S. persons’ privacy.14 Congress has already
begun to act in response to the threat of massive collection of U.S. persons’
data by companies that do not carefully protect that data.15
But the more people live out their lives in virtual worlds, the more
information can be data mined. Not only economic information like credit card
numbers can be recorded in virtual worlds. The false anonymity of novel
online environments has caused people to move their intimate lives online,
where every act can be monitored.16 Eventually, every movement, every gesture
in virtual worlds will be tracked and processed by private companies. The
government should take the lead in protecting consumer privacy from private
invasion by extending enforcement of law on data leaks17 to virtual worlds, by
enforcing existing law requiring informed consent prior to the collection of
personal information,18 and by enacting new law creating property rights in
personal information so that consumers will have adequate control if they
decide to sell their information.
conclusion
As people move their lives online, courts should recognize that rights move
with them by articulating a reasonable expectation of online privacy. Rights to
privacy do not stop at the gateway to virtual worlds. And the fact that
surveillance in virtual worlds can be ubiquitous does not indicate that it should
be. There is a serious danger that courts will determine that every aspect of a
person’s virtual life can be collected by private companies and passed along to
government actors subject to less stringent requirements than probable cause..
This would be an unfortunate result: either a vibrant and important
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Over 236 million records have been compromised in the United States since 2005. See
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, http://
www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
See, e.g., Aaron Ricadela, Congress Takes Aim at Spyware, BusinessWeek.com, June 18, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2007/tc20070618_693312.htm.
See PETER LUDLOW & MARK WALLACE, THE SECOND LIFE HERALD: THE VIRTUAL TABLOID
THAT WITNESSED THE DAWN OF THE METAVERSE 127-134 (2007) (detailing sexual practices
in virtual worlds). These sexual practices can be monitored and disclosed just as any other
activity in a virtual world may be.
See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 913, 915 (2007) (“The latest example of regulation through disclosure is a requirement
that companies notify individuals of data security incidents involving their personal
information.”).
See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 4052.5 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008) (requiring “explicit prior
consent” before financial institutions may share customer information).
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technology would fail, or people would give up all privacy just to use the
technology.
Even if government actors take privacy in virtual worlds seriously,
however, there remains the problem of private data collection. Virtual worlds
are enormous cameras. As people live more of their lives online, they will
provide more data that will then be collected and processed. Further, the rules
that courts and legislators craft for virtual worlds will soon be applied to the
real world because the two will begin to overlap. The next generation of
computers will be small enough to wear, and powerful enough to record and
parse everything around them. We will all record each other’s every action. The
Panopticon is a virtual world problem, but it will not remain so for very long.
Joshua Fairfield is an Associate Professor of Law at Washington & Lee University
School of Law. He writes and speaks on the governance and economics of virtual
worlds.
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